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Abstract 
We offer a critical appraisal of Over's (2020) seven challenges for dehumanization 
research in social psychology. While the challenges mainly attack an exaggerated version of 
the claims that dehumanization research actually makes, the positive suggestions that 
follow them open up some much-needed questions. By seeing humanity as a prototype-
based category, we can address more sensitively how various departures from prototypical 
humanity relate to each other. We can also ask whether all of these departures are equally 
necessary or sufficient explanations for the effects of dehumanizing treatment and 
metaphors in degrading moral consideration of other groups of people. 
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Commentary on Over (2020): Well-taken Points About Dehumanization, But 
Exaggerated Challenges 
Over (2020) presents seven challenges to a representation of the prevalent 
theoretical position about social dehumanization in social psychology. The article concludes 
with positive suggestions for ways to understand contemporary research and historical 
examples related to dehumanization. We, as authors, had different initial reactions to these 
arguments. Still, we ended up agreeing that while the positive suggestions are useful and 
lead to interesting questions for research, the objections are exaggerated. 
Specifically, Over characterizes the target “dehumanization hypothesis” in these 
words: “1) Victims of intergroup harm are perceived to be similar to non-human entities 2) 
As a result, natural inhibitions against causing them harm are eroded leading, in extreme 
cases, to genocide and torture.” (page number TBD) 
But this is not the statement that the seven challenges actually are aimed at refuting, 
by and large. Here is our reconstruction of that statement, differences italicized: 
1) Victims of intergroup harm, and nobody else, are explicitly affirmed to be identical 
to non-human entities. 2) As an inevitable result of dehumanization, natural inhibitions 
against causing them harm are eroded, and all aspects of genocide and torture can be 
completely explained via this mechanism. 
We know no researchers on intergroup dehumanization who have endorsed such an 
extreme statement. And yet, Over’s objections target the extreme version, but miss many 
nuances of the more reasonable one. To go through the challenges, one by one: 
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#1. Examples of ingroups likening themselves to well-regarded animals challenge the 
extreme claim “victims of intergroup harm, and nobody else …” but not the actual 
hypothesis that focuses only on victims of harm. Indeed, it is possible for an ingroup to 
ennoble (or brutalize) itself through comparison to a specific animal, and also to lower and 
brutalize the enemy group through seeing them as less than human. Nor do the examples 
refute findings about the relative prevalence of ingroup and outgroup dehumanization – 
most studies of this topic compare the humanity of the ingroup to that of the outgroup, 
finding a relative difference, without requiring that the ingroup be seen as fully human. And 
finally, while some individual species may be seen as admirable, the general category 
“animal” and indeed most animal names are not, we suspect, compliments when applied to 
people. An exception proves the rule: the generic “animal” becomes grudgingly positive 
when traits seen as uniquely human, such as inhibition or mercy, must be cast off to achieve 
some goal (“fight like beasts,” “party animals,” etc.) 
#2 and #4. Showing that victims of intergroup violence are sometimes, even often, 
described in human (#2) and mentalizing (#4) terms refutes the extreme claim that they are 
seen as “identical” to animals, but not the actual claim that they are seen as similar. In fact, 
all the research and theory lines reviewed in the paper specify only one or two dimensions 
of perceived difference as crucial, be it essence, mental development, mental traits, or 
emotional experience. Here, too, the argument becomes perilously unfalsifiable when 
explicit descriptions of humans as animals are taken as evidence that the humans are 
actually not seen as animals  – “There is no sense in consistently reminding a rat that it is, in 
fact, a rat“ (p.  TBD).  
#3. If we reject implicit group-animal/human associations as evidence for 
dehumanization, this refutes only the phantom claim that dehumanization must be explicit. 
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First of all, some evidence for everyday intergroup dehumanization is explicit or “blatant” in 
nature (Kteily & Bruneau, 2017). But also, as Over acknowledges in the final section, the 
function of an associative metaphor is to bring to mind information in line with the 
metaphor, whether or not its proposition is actually endorsed. If a group of people is 
associated with apes, this facilitates the same kind of judgments of them as mentally and 
culturally lesser, more violent, etc. as if the similarity were explicitly believed. Research on 
implicit associations (e.g., Goff, Eberhardt, et al, 2008) supports this point by connecting 
such associations to more explicit forms of discrimination. The absence of explicit 
endorsement, whether sincere or motivated by social presentation, does not undermine the 
reality of the phenomenon. 
#5. Again, the specific nature of most actual theories of dehumanization allows for 
people to be seen both as the human category “criminal” or “avaricious” and as similar to 
animals in other ways. In fact, there is no other way to interpret the majority of intergroup 
dehumanization studies which start from the premise of group labels that only apply to 
humans (e.g., “pedophiles,” “terrorists” in Giner-Sorolla & Russell, 2019, or the national and 
racial labels in many other published studies), making it absurd to hold total 
dehumanization as a standard. Additionally, dehumanization has seldom been claimed to be 
the motivation behind every act of cruelty. In fact, Bandura (1999) outlines numerous other 
mechanisms of moral disengagement that can both facilitate and justify post-hoc such acts, 
such as denying responsibility or using euphemistic language. These mechanisms disengage 
the conscience in many more ways than putting victims outside of moral concern by viewing 
them as less than human.  
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#6. To the extent that this objection is distinct from #5, it points out that some forms 
of cruelty and discrimination are aimed at harming people through their human faculties of 
imagination, self-regard, etc. This objection, too, aims for the phantom point that total 
dehumanization is necessary to explain all facets of crimes against humanity. But unlike the 
previous ones, this challenge does successfully hit an assumption of many theories that is 
not explicitly tested: the assumption that human-like mentalization is a sufficient, active 
ingredient to activate the special moral concern that attaches to the human species. It 
questions, in other words, whether all dimensions of perceived humanity bear equally on 
moral treatment. 
#7. Like #6, this challenge only argues for a plurality of grounds for human status, as 
indeed the theories reviewed provide, rather than against the importance of human status 
per se. But it does succeed in questioning whether human mental traits are necessary to the 
moral consideration that attaches to the human category. Going even beyond the provided 
example of a baby, the moral status of a human fetus or embryo critically depends on 
whether it is seen as a human life. It is this essential interpretation of human “similarity” 
that often intervenes in morality, to arouse concern for individuals whose mental status is 
not at all prototypical.  
Although these seven lines of attack mostly miss the point of actual dehumanization 
theory and research, the positive mechanisms proposed nearer the end of the article are 
welcome. They demand clarity in a field of research that often confuses several concepts 
under the label “dehumanization.” We now share our thoughts on two more specific 
implications for research going forward. 
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1. Dehumanization as a matter of prototype (de)categorization.  It never was 
plausible to anyone that human beings are dehumanized by being completely excluded 
from the human category, or by being treated in every respect like animals. Rather, a more 
useful concept is that groups of humans might be judged as non-prototypical, 
metaphorically likened to objects or animals less worthy of moral consideration (rather than 
to angels or lions) and therefore subject to inferior treatment. This corresponds to the 
dominant prototype models of categorization in cognitive psychology (e.g., Rosch, 1975), in 
which decisions operate via similarity and centrality of exemplars to a set of prototypical 
traits, rather than via all-or-none categorization.  
For example, even though antisocial characteristics such as cunning and villainy may 
be seen as typical of humans more so than animals, they may also indicate that their 
possessors are not prototypical humans, and therefore lacking a number of other typical 
human characteristics that Haslam (2006) and Leyens and colleagues (2000) elaborated in 
research, such as conscience or capacity for reflection. The prototype model leads to 
caution about equivalence between these human-defining traits, because a person can be 
seen as human on one of the following dimensions, yet dehumanized on others: 
• Human essential category (vs. all nonhumans; as measured by blatant 
identification as human, and by associations to the human concept)  
• Human mental complexity (vs. animals; as measured by human uniqueness traits 
and emotions) 
• Human (and animal) capacity for spontaneity and creativity (vs. inanimate 
objects and machines; as measured by human nature traits) 
• Human (and animal) capacity for suffering (vs. insensate things) 
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• Human prosociality (vs. villains or “demons”) 
It would be an empirical question whether any given non-prototypical status would 
entail degradation along other dimensions of humanity. That is, a “criminal,” while 
acknowledged as having some amount of mind and intentionality, may or may not be seen 
as similar to non-human entities such as animals (e.g., wild dog), intelligent but emotionless 
machines (e.g., the Terminator), or more fanciful examples of antisocial nonhumans such as 
demons, zombies, or monsters. This also calls for empirical tests, rather than assumptions, 
of whether each departure from prototypical humanity undermines the granting of positive 
moral rights (e.g. citizenship) and negative ones (e.g. freedom from harm). In this regard, 
projects such as Bastian, Laham et al. (2011), linking lower levels of different prototypical 
human traits to differential diminutions of moral responsibility and suffering, are admirable 
if by no means completely resolved. 
But we also should not lose sight of the requirement that to be meaningfully called 
“dehumanization,” all these dimensions should be demonstrably linked to a reluctance to 
include target individuals and groups in the human essential category, the first one we have 
listed. Otherwise, in line with Over’s suggestions, it would be more parsimonious simply to 
speak of denial of emotional experience, mental capacities, and so on, rather than to use 
the blanket term “dehumanization.”  
If the different elements of the human prototype were shown to be inherently 
connected to each other, then even applying positive animal metaphors to the ingroup 
would carry added drawbacks. Perhaps the purpose of these is to dehumanize the ingroup 
in selected, very specific ways – to promote and advertise the freedom from remorse and 
inhibition ascribed to animals in the specific context of winning a sports game or a war. 
Perhaps, all the same, these seemingly complimentary metaphors could create associations 
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of the ingroup with inhumanity that have paradoxical effects, such as lowering the impulse 
to cooperate with other ingroup members. 
2. Dehumanization can only be partial in a “humanized” world. 
Under a prototype model of the human category, the multiplicity of mental 
dimensions makes less likely the extreme case of dehumanisation in which perceivers deny 
victims their mind (or “human essence”) altogether and only view them as bodies or meat: 
for example, when consumers perceive animals that they eat to possess a less complex 
mental life than other domestic animals, such as pets (Bastian, Loughnan, et al., 2012). 
There are more examples for such denials of minds during wartime (e.g., militaries referring 
to a “body count” to keep track of the number of killed enemy soldiers). However, even a 
focus on the physical body does not often lead to full de-mentalization, but rather to a 
differential perception of certain mental states (Gray, Knobe, et al., 2011). Even in seemingly 
extreme cases of dehumanisation, people still do perceive minds and mental characteristics 
in victims. 
 Indeed, most cases of dehumanisation are probably the result of some kind of 
flexible mind perception and ascription, as Over points out. After all, humans are animals. 
As Over rightly states, comparisons to non-human entities are not reserved for outgroups 
(challenge #1, p. TBD). Consequently, dehumanisation seems to rest on the more 
fundamental phenomenon of ascribing minds to non-human entities in the first place, a 
phenomenon referred to as anthropomorphism (Epley, Waytz, & Cacioppo, 2007). Children 
(Hood, Gjersoe, & Bloom, 2012) and adults (Forstmann & Burgmer, 2015) view minds (both 
of animals and humans) as distinct from the physical world, and we can’t help but see them 
everywhere.  
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People therefore seem rather inclined to impose at least some dimensions of 
humanity, rather than neglect it. However, Over writes that “It would be extremely unusual, 
and most likely inappropriate, to describe an animal or a machine as disloyal or spiteful, for 
example” (p. TBD). But who has never yelled at their computer or another piece of 
malfunctioning equipment that was (presumably intentionally) “messing with us”? Similarly, 
who hasn’t laughed at one of the countless videos on YouTube showing how loyal dogs are, 
and that cats could not be any more disloyal and indifferent? People are apparently more 
likely to rely on the idea of lesser minds, or lesser persons, than to completely abandon 
mind and person concepts when dealing with nonhuman -- or dehumanized -- beings. 
To conclude, we think the field of dehumanization research has been overdue for a 
focus on its fundamental terms and assumptions. Although the challenges presented here 
by Over do not destroy the evidence for dehumanization, they do force its proponents to be 
more clear about what they mean, and to do more work to test the coherence of the human 
category’s many facets. A dimension that forms part of the human prototype may or may 
not connect directly to categorizing those who lack it as “less human” in essence. And given 
the ubiquitous occurrence of mind perception, it may be hard to see any sufficiently 
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